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Abstract: This paper examines empirically whether manufacturing firms in Brazil share rents with 
their employees. We use detailed individual-level matched data, covering the 1997-2002 period, 
based on our merging of three different data sets: RAIS, PIA and “Censo de Capitais”. We also seek 
to  account  for  the  possible  endogeneity  of  profits,  using  better  measures  of  profits  and  using 
instruments  based  on  financial  accounting  variables  and/or  exchange  rates  and  firms  export 
propensities. In our preferred specifications, we do not find evidence of rent sharing. 
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JEL codes: J31, J41. 
 
 
Resumo: O objetivo deste trabalho é testar empiricamente a hipótese de rent sharing (divisão de 
rendas/lucros)  para  as  indústrias  brasileiras.  Para  testar  a  hipótese  de  rent  sharing,  o  presente 
trabalho  utiliza  um  matching  composto  por  dados  da  RAIS  (Relatório  Anual  de  Informações 
Sociais), PIA (Pesquisa Industrial Anual) e Censo de Capitais do Banco Central do Brasil para os 
anos de 1997-2002. Controles para uma possível endogeneidade dos lucros foram efetuados através 
de medidas alternativas de lucros e instrumentos baseados em variáveis contábeis, taxas de câmbio 
e propensões a exportar das firmas. Em nossas especificações preferidas não foram encontradas 
evidências de rent sharing para a economia brasileira. 
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Is There Rent Sharing In Developing Countries? 




Although 80% of the world’s population lives in developing countries, there is considerably less 
empirical evidence about the labour markets of these countries than about the labour markets of 
developed countries. Moreover, such lack of evidence may be something particularly important to 
address, as developing countries are usually characterised by high levels of inequality, suggesting 
that a considerable share of their populations endure particularly low levels of quality of life (see 
Behrman, 1999). 
 
Brazil is an important case in point, as it is a large developing country that exhibits one of the 
highest levels of income inequality in the world. According to the World Bank (2005), Brazil’s Gini 
index in 2001 was 59.3, the eighth highest in a list of 123 countries, and the second highest outside 
of Africa, even if it has been decreasing moderately since 1993 (Ferreira et al, 2006). Moreover, 
while Brazil’s inequality may be influenced by the informality of its labour market (28% of the 
workforce, when excluding the self-employed, according to World Bank and IPEA, 2002), and also 
by its disparate levels of human capital, inequality is also extremely high inside the formal sector 
(Arbache and De Negri, 2004). 
 
In this paper, we focus on wage inequality in the formal labour market and seek to assess what may 
be the role of rent sharing. Our motivation for this specific analysis is driven by the large evidence 
that the division of rents between employers and their employees is an important component of the  
explanation of wage differentials, not only in developed countries (Abowd and Lemieux, 1993; 
Blanchflower et al, 1996; Van Reenen, 1996; Bronars and Famulari, 2001; Arai, 2003; Estevão and 
Tevlin, 2003; Kramarz, 2003; Martins, 2004; etc)
1 but maybe also in developing countries (Teal, 
1996, Revenga, 1997, and Bigsten et al, 2003). Moreover, rent sharing is also typically related to 
other sources of inequality, including gender and racial discrimination (Black and Strahan, 2001), 
which are also deemed relevant in the Brazilian case. 
 
However,  there  are  also  reasons  to  expect  that  employers  in  developing  countries  would  be 
particularly  immune  to  any  possible  wage  bargaining  pressures  arising  from  their  employees. 
Amongst other factors, unions are typically not particularly strong outside the developed world; 
minimum  wages  are  low  or  not  enforced;  and  unemployment  benefits  do  not  exist  in  many 
countries. Moreover, as suggested before, the size of the informal labour market may imply that 
firms face flatter labour supply curves, thus weakening the bargaining power of workers in the 
formal sector. On the other hand, Brazil’s relatively stringent employment law may increase the 
workers’  bargaining  power,  although  possibly  at  the  cost  of  increased  informality  and  other 
inefficiencies.
2 However, the employment law’s unintended incentives for worker turnover, related 
to  the  fact  that  social  insurance  individual  accounts  are  remunerated  at  below-market  rates 
(Gonzaga, 2004), may also make it more difficult for workers to bargain over rents. 
 
                                                 
1 Margolis and Salvanes (2001) is, in part, an exception to this stylised fact. 
2 Botero et al (2004) classify Brazil as the 32
nd most rigid employment legislation and the 23
rd highest firing costs in 
their ranking of 85 countries. See also Almeida and Carneiro (2005) for a study of informality in the Brazilian labour 
market and World Bank, IPEA (2002) for a detailed study of different aspects of the Brazilian labour market, and 
Menezes-Filho et al (2005) for an analysis of wage differences across firms and workers in the state of São Paulo.   3 
Another motivation point in our study is that we are able to draw on particularly detailed panel data, 
which allow us to tackle many troublesome econometric problems that arise when estimating rent 
sharing  effects.  The  data  are  driven  from  three  different  individual-  and/or  firm-level  panels 
covering the period 1997-2002. In particular, one of the data sets includes several variables for all 
individual workers of all manufacturing sector firms with more than 30 employees (plus a sample 
of smaller firms), resulting in an extremely large sample coverage, about half the entire population.  
 
Finally, Brazil’s economic and political history over the period we cover also offers a number of 
complementary identification strategies. In particular, we use different instruments based on several 
macroeconomic shocks faced by the country, related to sudden and sharp movements in exchange 
and interest rates, which are likely to affect different firms differently (namely depending on their 
export propensities). Following an approach similar to Martins (2004), we also proxy rents using 
“gross profits” (i.e. profits before subtracting the wage bill), in order to avoid the bias that arises 
from the fact that firms that share more rents will also have lower net profits (the standard measure 
of  rents  used  in  the  literature).  Finally,  we  also  account  for  (time-invariant)  worker  and  firm 
heterogeneity using spell fixed effects. 
 
Our evidence, robust to different checks, indicates that, once endogeneity and/or heterogeneity are 
addressed, rent sharing is not an important force in explaining wage differentials in Brazil. This is a 
result that we find surprising given the previously-mentioned findings in the literature, although not 
so  much  when  taking  into  account  some  of  the  specific  characteristics  of  the  Brazilian  labour 
market mentioned before. However, the inexistence of rent sharing in Brazil suggests that other 
factors,  possibly  involving  unobservable  differences  across  workers,  are  driving  the  country’s 
inequality.  
 
The structure of the remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the data and some 
descriptive statistics, Section 3 presents the results under different econometric assumptions and our 





The data set used in this paper is derived from three different data sources: RAIS, PIA and CCBB 
which we use to cover the period 1997 to 2002. RAIS (Annual Social Information Report) is an 
annual census of all firms and their employees in Brazil. There is detailed information about each 
employee  (wages,  hours  worked,  education,  age,  tenure,  gender,  etc)  and  each  firm  (industry, 
region, size, establishment type, etc), including a unique identifier for each employee, each firm and 
each establishment.  
 
The second data source is PIA (Yearly Industrial Research) covers all manufacturing sector firms 
with at least 30 employees and a random sample of 10% of firms with between 5 and 30 employees. 
From  PIA  we  extract  the  information  concerning  firms’  profits  and  also  additional  data  about 
revenues  and  costs.  Finally,  we  also  use  CCE  (Foreign  Capitals  Census),  which  has  detailed 
information about the foreign ownership structure of firms based in Brazil. We use these data to 
identify foreign firms, defined as those in which at least 50% of their equity is owned by foreign 
investors.  
 
Tables 1a and 2a report more information about the data size. There are on average more than 5 
million workers per year and almost 25,000 firms per year. At the firm level, there are more than 
40,000 different firms, of which more than 12,000 are present in all six years covered. Tables 1b 
and 2b present information about the subset of exporting firms, defined here as firms that export a   4 
non-zero share of their output in at least one year over the period 1997-2002. It can be seen in the 
tables that more than half of all employees in the data are in firms that export, although the number 
of these firms is much smaller – as expected, exporting firms are bigger than non-exporting firms. 
 
We also report some descriptive statistics of the main variables in Table 3. All financial variables 
are converted to 2002 prices. One important point relates to the steep decline of the real hourly 
wage, of more than 20%. At the same time, workers schooling increased by about one year while 
(Mincer) experience and tenure both fall. These events are most likely related to the process of 
economic  reforms  introduced  in  the  late  1980s,  when  tariffs  were  reduced  substantially.  The 
adjustment to these reform involved substantial reallocation and marked declines in the employment 
levels in the manufacturing sector. This decline is mirrored in the declining number of workers 
present in our data up to 1999 (or up to 1998 in the case of exporting firms), after which the 
employment level increases, although real wages kept falling.
3 Tenure is also relatively low, which 
may be related to high levels of turnover that are characteristic of the Brazilian labour market. 
Tenure  also  increases  up  to  1999  (when  employment  is  falling)  and  falls  after  that  (when 
employment is increasing). 
 
The net profits variable is also testimony to the difficult years of the Brazilian economy: average 
profits are negative in 1999 and 2002, when interest rates were increased in order to sustain the 
currency, while gross profits (i.e. net profits plus the wage bill) are always positive.  
 
Similarly to the case of wages, the wage bills also exhibit a downward trend, except for 2002. These 
wage bills are derived directly from information provided by each firm, and include, on top of net 
wages, also taxes, overtime pay, 13
th and 14
th month pay, etc. These latter components correspond 
to about 100% of net wages, a result that emphasises the heavy burden faced by firms that hire from 
the formal labour market and that helps explaining the large size of the informal labour market .  
 
The descriptive statistics also indicate the importance of the external market for our sample of 
Brazilian firms, as, on average, more than 10% of sales are exported. Only about one fifth of these 
exports go to Mercosul, while less than 2% is exported to Mercosul is 2002, after the Argentinean 
peso was devalued by more then 50%. 
 
When  focusing  only  on  workers  whose  firms  export,  there  are  many  differences  that  can  be 
mentioned. For instance, this subset of workers are paid higher wages, they are more educated and 
have higher tenure. Their firms’ levels of equity  per worker  are also higher. Export levels  are 
obviously  higher  (in  which  abut  4%  of  sales  reach  other  Mercosul  countries  while  about  21% 
concern the rest of the world).  
 
The profit levels of exporting firms are also higher than the entire set of manufacturing firms in our 
sample (except for 2002). Moreover, these profits are also more variable over time: they range 
between approximately 7,000 and -3,000 reais per worker (in 2001 and 2002, respectively), while 
the same average annual profits for the entire set of firms range between approximately 12,000 and 
-5,000 reais per worker (also in 2001 and 2002, respectively). Given the higher wages paid by 
exporting firms, their wage bills and gross profits are also higher.  
 
 
                                                 
3 See Ribeiro et al (2004) for more evidence on the process of job reallocation in Brazilian manufacturing over this 
period. Arbache et al (2004) and Gonzaga et al (2006) present (partly contradictory) evidence on the impact of trade 
liberalisation upon education wage differentials. Interestingly for our purposes, Arbache et al (2004), who find evidence 
that trade liberalisation increased the education premium, also suggest that the lower wages in the traded sector after 
liberalisation are a consequence of reduced rents (page F93).   5 
3. Results 
 
As indicated in the introduction, our analysis is based on a standard wage equation, augmented by a 
measure of profitability. (More details on the derivation of this equation from a model of firm and 
worker bargaining are available on Appendix 4.) Following from equation (8) in that Appendix, we 
can consider the following wage equation:  
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lnwit is the log of the hourly wage of worker i in period t, Xit is a vector of worker i variables in 
period t, Fit is a vector of firm variables (the firm that employs worker i in period t), πLit is the net 
profit of the firm that employs that worker
4, and nit is the number of employees of the same firm. 
The parameter β3 indicates the bargaining power of workers. 
 
 
3.1. Gross and Net Profits 
 
Our initial results, presented in Table 4, are obtained using pooled OLS. In this and the following 
tables, we present the coefficients on a selected group of regressors and their t-statistics (corrected 
for worker clustering). On top of the regressors presented (schooling, gender, experience, tenure, 
foreign firm and log firm size) we also consider in all specifications a quartic in experience; a 
quadratic in tenure; year, occupation, region and industry dummies; and interactions between all 
human capital variables and the gender dummy. All of these variables, in all models, present similar 
results to those that have been obtained for other countries. 
 
Column 3 of Table 4 presents the results for net profits, indicating a significant β3 of 0.0374. When 
considering instead gross profits, we find again a significant β3 but this time about ten times bigger, 
at 0.349. As expected, the use of a measure of profits that predates the payment of the wage bill 
(gross  profits)  indicates  that  the  more  common  net  profits  generate  a  downward  bias  on  the 
estimates of rent sharing. 
 
An useful measure of the implications of these parameters in terms of generating wage differences 
is the Lester Range (Lester, 1952). This range corresponds to 4 times the product of the rent sharing 
parameter and the standard deviation of profits (per worker). This formula can be interpreted as 
indicating the wage increase, in percentage terms, of a worker that would move from a firm with 
low profits (more precisely, a firm whose profitability is two standard deviations below the mean 
profitability of the firms in the sample) to a firm with high profits (a firm placed two standard 
deviations above mean profitability). The Lester ranges for these two estimates in Table 4 are 5.4% 
and 49.9%.  
 
Taking these numbers at face value, the gross profits estimate (our preferred estimate for reasons 
explained before) suggests that rent sharing is indeed an important factor in the Brazilian labour 
market. These values are also comparable (if not higher than) those figures obtained for different 
developed countries: Blanchflower et al (1996) finds a Lester range of 24% for the US; Arai (2003) 
documents ranges between 12% and 24% for Sweden; Hildreth and Oswald (1997) find a figure of 
16% for the UK; and Martins (2004) presents a range of 56% for Portugal. 
 
 
                                                 
4 For convenience of presentation, all profit variables have been multiplied by 100,000.   6 
3.2. Instrumental Variables  
 
An additional concern present in the estimation of rent sharing related to the endogeneity of profits. 
For instance, if one considers an efficiency wage model, profits (even gross profits) and wages will 
be  simultaneously  determined.  Variation  of  profits  across  firms  may  also  capture  worker 
unobserved characteristics that also affect those workers wages.    
 
Our first approach at dealing with endogeneity involves the use of instruments. The first set of 
instruments we use is made of different components of revenues and costs, namely those related to 
financial  investments,  participations  in  other  firms,  and  non-operational  activities.  Our 
identification assumption is thus that these six components of profits do not affect directly wages, 
although they are correlated with profits. We believe that this is likely to be true because bargaining 
over wages is typically related to profits in the firm’s mainstream activities, e.g. cars for a car 
manufacturer. If that firm happens to benefit from a bump in profits driven by activities unrelated to 
the production of cars, unions are less likely to want to extract a share of those profits. 
 
An additional important aspect concerns the macroeconomic instability of Brazil over the period 
covered. The first important episode of such instability occurs in January 1999 when the central 
bank  is  forced  to  move  from  a  fixed  to  a  floating  exchange  rate.  At  the  same  time,  inflation 
targeting is adopted and interest rates are increased substantially as a way to counteract inflationary 
expectations that may have been induced by the depreciation of the Real. There is a second episode 
of  interest  rate  hikes  in  2002,  following  the  exchange  rate  pressure  induced  by  the  Brazilian 
presidential  elections.  These  two  events  imply  that  firms  will  see  their  profitability  negatively 
affected, in particular if they have engaged in large financial investments. We thus expect that 
financial losses will be an important determinant of profits while, as argued before, we believe it 
should have no direct impact on wages. 
 
Table 5 presents our results, using the 2SLS method, considering either net or gross profits and 
either only the financial instruments or all instruments (financial and exchange rate instruments). 
Unlike before, we now obtain negative coefficients, ranging between -0.0548 and -0.0420, both of 
which are precisely estimated. Following the results of Shea (1996) and Bound et al (1995), we also 
investigate the strength of the instruments in the first-stage or auxiliary equation, as measured by 
the values of the partial R
2 and the joint F-test of the instruments. In Table 2.1 (Appendix 2), we 
find reassuring results, as all coefficients of the instruments are highly significant and generate at 
least reasonable partial R
2’s. Consistently with our view of the role of macroeconomic instability 
upon profits, the role of financial losses in explaining net or gross profits is particularly large. 
 
These negative findings indicate that rent sharing is not an important feature of the Brazilian labour 
market, unlike was suggested by the approach which ignored endogeneity. The Lester ranges are 
also particularly small, ranging between -8% and -6%. We now will test the robustness of our 
results to different instruments and to controls for other sources of bias. 
 
Exchange rate fluctuations are another dimension of the period of macroeconomic instability faced 
by Brazil. As indicated before, Brazil sustained considerable pressure upon its currency over those 
years;  on  top  of  that,  the  currencies  of  some  of  its  neighbours  –  in  particular  Argentina,  an 
important trade partner under Mercosul - also faced adjustments. These currency shocks can also be 
used as instruments, as a cheaper real in terms of dollars or euros translates into cheaper exports and 
thus higher profits (measured in the Brazilian currency) for exporting firms.  
 
Figure  3.1  (Appendix  3)  describes  the  evolution  of  the  three  different  exchange  rates  over  the 
period. As indicated before, these are the depreciations that take place in January 1999 and then in   7 
the second half of 2002. Before that, in December 2001, Argentina also replaced its currency board 
with a floating system, leading to a massive depreciation of their currency with respect to the Real 
and other currencies. Figure 3.2 describes the evolution of the interest rate: it can be seen the large 
instability in 1997 and 1999 and the subsequent increasing trend since the mid/late 2001, as the 
2002 elections campaign progressed. 
 
In order to exploit these events in terms of our estimation of the rent sharing parameter, we merge 
into our data information from the PIA data set about the shares of sales which are exported either 
to Mercosul or to the rest of the world. We then also multiply these shares by exchange rates of the 
real with respect to the Argentinean Peso or a weighted average of the dollar and the euro (the 
weights being the exports from Brazil to either the US or the European Union.)   
   
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 present the results for the sub-sample of exporting firms. We find that 
the new estimates of the β3 parameter are still negative and of a magnitude similar to the case of the 
previous set of instruments. These estimates are -0.0746 and -0.0504, for net and gross profits, 
respectively, each coefficient again statistically significant. Lester ranges are -11.2% and -7.5%, 
respectively. Regarding the first-stage results, we again find that our instruments are statistically 
significant and of the predicted positive sign (Table 2.2, Appendix 2). This positive sign means that, 
the higher the share of sales that is exported, the greater the impact of a depreciation of the real in 
terms of the firms profitability. It is also interesting to notice that the role of exports to the rest of 
the World (ie other countries than those in Mercosul) is much bigger than that of the exports to 
Mercosul. 
 
We conclude from our instrumental variable analysis that the evidence of rent sharing documented 
in the simple models that do not account for the endogeneity of profits is misleading. The higher 
wages  of  employees  of  more  profitable  firms  is  artificially  driven  by  the  simultaneous 
determination of profits and wages. When using shocks to profits that are arguably unrelated to the 
forces that determine wages, then no evidence can be found that wages increase with profits.  
 
 
3.4 Spell Fixed Effects 
 
Our additional source of bias concerns the heterogeneity across firms and workers. Up until now, 
this heterogeneity was assumed to be uncorrelated with profits. Moreover, different observations of 
the  same  individual  or  the  same  firm  over  time  were  not  treated  differently  from  different 
observations of different individuals or different firms.  
 
In this sub-section we address this issue by incorporating into our instrumental variables approach 
controls  for  worker  and  firm  heterogeneity.  Given  that  we  are  not  interested  in  estimating  the 
heterogeneity itself (Abowd et al, 1999) but only in controlling for its possible biases, we adopt a 
spell fixed effects method. This corresponds to conducting a within-spell estimation, each spell 
being a firm-worker match, as indicated by the following equation: 
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where νij denotes the worker-firm spell fixed effect. Then, by mean-differencing equation (2) with 
respect to the spell means, one obtains:  
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   8 
in which each barred variable represents the mean of that variable for each spell (defined as a 
worker-firm match) over time. Since both worker and firm heterogeneity are controlled for in this 
equation, the rent sharing parameter (β3) can be estimated consistently, which was not necessarily 
the case in the previous sections.  
 
Table  6  presents  the  results  for  models  that  include  spell  fixed  effects,  first  disregarding  the 
endogeneity of profits and then instrumenting profits as before. We find in both specifications, and 
similarly to the previous results, very small bargaining parameters and correspondingly small Lester 
ranges, between -3.8% and -0.4%.
5 These results strengthen our earlier findings that, consistently 
with the operation of a competitive market, Brazilian workers do not receive any share of the rents 
earned by their employers. 
 
 
3.5 Robustness Analysis 
 
One possible explanation for the lack of evidence of rent sharing documented so far in the paper is 
that many firms are facing losses, not profits. To the extent that rent sharing applies only when 
firms have profits, then one should not expect a positive correlation between profits and wages in 
our data. Moreover, as in other countries, the Brazilian labour law makes it very difficult that firms 
cut their workers’ nominal pay. While this constraint was obviously of little practical importance 
during the period of high inflation, prices have largely been under control since the Real plan was 
introduced in 1994. In this context, because of either an intrinsic asymmetry in the process of rent 
sharing or because of the downward nominal wage rigidity constraint in the law, rent sharing could 
remain  a  feature  of  the  labour  market,  but  one  which  would  only  emerge  during  periods  of 
economic expansion.  
 
In order to test this alternative interpretation of our results, we repeat our previous analysis for the 
subset of workers employed by firms with at least 30 employees and covered during the years of 
1999, 2000 and 2001. This was a period of uninterrupted economic growth in which the economy 
was not affected by major shocks, growing at reasonable rates (the growth rates of GDP per capita 
were  0.8%,  4.3%  and  1.3%,  respectively).  If  our  previous  discussion  is  correct,  this  would 
necessarily be a period in which rent sharing would be documented. By focusing on larger firms, we 
also hope to bias our results towards higher levels of rent sharing, as smaller firms may be affected 
by greater instability.  
 
Tables 7a and 7b present information about the sample size of the new data set and the equivalent 
descriptive  statistics  as  those  of  Table  3.  It  can  be  seen  that  more  than  80%  of  workers  are 
employed by firms with 30 or more employees (either when compared to all firms or only firms that 
export).  In  total,  there  are  about  4.5  million  workers  per  year,  of  which  about  2.5  million  are 
employed by exporting firms. 
 
Our  regression  results  (based  on  the  models  considering  gross  profits,  spell  fixed  effects  and 
instruments – financial variables or financial and export/exchange rate variables) – see Table 8 – 
indicate that there is indeed only some very mild evidence that, in periods of economic growth, 
firms are likely to share some of their profits with their employees. The largest Lester range found 
(for the specification based on exporters and the complete set of instrumental variables) is not 
bigger than 4%. 
 
                                                 
5 We have also run these models for net profits and the results were again qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. 
These results are available upon request.   9 
In order to be even more stringent in the analysis, we also consider a sub-sample of the set of firms 
present in the 1999-2001 period, in which we focus only on firms whose profits increased over each 
year (i.e. in 2000 with respect to 1999 and in 2001 with respect to 2000). Tables 9a and 9b present 
the descriptive statistics, where it becomes clear that the imposition of the profits constraint leads to 
a much smaller sample: about 500,000 workers per  year and 1,600 firms (all firms) and about 
350,000 workers per year and 600 firms (exporting firms only). 
 
Table 10 presents our results using these second sub-samples. Consistently with our predictions, we 
find larger Lester ranges than in our previous estimates. However, our rent sharing parameter is 
never big enough so that the corresponding Lester range would exceed 14%. This Lester range is 
also particularly small when comparing it to figures from other countries: in similar analysis (i.e. 
considering only firms whose profits increase) and covering the labour markets of Sweden and 
Portugal,  Arai  and  Heyman  (2001)  and  Martins  (2004),  respectively,  find  much  larger  Lester 
ranges, ranging between 50% and 60%. 
 
Moreover, in Martins and Esteves (2006), is also conducted a specific analysis of rent sharing 
across four of the main foreign car manufacturing firms located in São Paulo’s industrial area (the 
so-called “ABC”). The motivation for this analysis is, in part, derived from the fact that the unions 
of the car manufacturing industry in the ABC region are known by their strong bargaining power, 
possibly the strongest in Brazil. However, even for this very specific industry/region, and across 
different specifications, it is founded Lester ranges which never exceeded 26%.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This is one of the first papers that examines rent sharing in a developing country (see Teal, 1996, 
and Bigsten et al, 2003, who examine the case of four African countries) and is the first that does so 
exploiting particularly rich matched panel data. Moreover, the quality of our data, together with the 
variability  of  the  macroeconomic  environment,  also  allows  us  to  pay  particular  attention  to  a 
number of econometric problems that may have affected previous research. 
 
We study the case of Brazil, a large country characterised by huge income disparities, and examine 
a period in which the economy was hit by different macroeconomic shocks. Exploiting these shocks 
as sources of exogenous shifters in profitability, and tackling also other econometric problems, we 
find what we believe is robust evidence that rent sharing is not a feature of the Brazilian labour 
market. Across almost all specifications, we find precisely estimated parameters indicating virtually 
zero rent sharing. Even when selecting a relatively small subset of our data that would lead, in our 
view, to the strongest possible evidence of rent sharing, we still find very small results, about one 
third of the corresponding findings for developed countries.  
 
Regarding possible explanations for our evidence of no rent sharing, we believe that an important 
role is played by the relative weakness of different labour market institutions in Brazil. For instance, 
unions are relatively segmented and weak and tend to increase pay of the most qualified workers 
only, thus even promoting further inequality (Arbache, 2002). Employment law may also indirectly 
foster excessive worker turnover and thus hurt rent sharing, as relatively long periods of tenure are 
typically required for workers to gain significant bargaining power in their firms. For instance, only 
after  investing  in  firm-specific  skills  may  workers  benefit  from  the  rents  generated  by  such 
investments.
6  
                                                 
6 In current research, we are investigating if there are differences across different types of industries and firms (profits, 
worker turnover, export propensities) or  workers (tenure,  education,  hierarchy,  gender), regarding the rent  sharing   10 
 
Besides  contributing  to  a  better  understanding  of  the  labour  markets  of  Brazil  and  of  other 
developing countries, our results may also help the analysis of the reasons for and the policies 
against the large levels of income inequality documented for Brazil. For instance, to the extent that 
firms do not share rents, racial and gender discrimination may become less likely determinants of 
inequality. On the other hand, our evidence puts more weight on differences in observable and/or 
unobservable  individual endowments  and  in  convexities  in the  returns  to  those endowments  as 
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Table 1a. Number of Workers and Firms 
Year  Number of Workers  Number of Firms 
1997  5.507.887  21.642 
1998  5.048.225  22.904 
1999  4.971.535  23.678 
2000  5.266.867  23.967 
2001  5.474.064  25.819 
2002  5.726.771  27.225 
 
 
Table 1b. Number of Workers and Firms (exporting firms only) 
Year  Number of Workers  Number of Firms 
1997  2.926.827  5.033 
1998  2.692.923  5.273 
1999  2.705.760  5.623 
2000  2.802.242  5.688 
2001  2.987.354  6.086 
2002  3.117.915  6.322 
 
Table 2a. Distribution of firm appearances in data 
Number of years  Number of firms 
Only 1 year  9.096 
2 years  6.737 
3 years  5.447 
4 years  4.053 
5 years  3.350 
6 years  12.227 
  
 
Table 2b. Distribution of firm appearances in data (exporting firms only) 
Number of Years  Number of Firms 
Only 1 year  2.795 
2 years  1.702 
3 years  1.327 
4 years  1.007 
5 years  949 
6 years  2.512   14 
Table 3a: Descriptive Statistics: Mean and (Standard Deviation) 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Log hourly wage 
 
              1,45 
(0,94)  
        1,47 
(0,94)  
                 1,36 
(0,91)  
                 1,24 
(0,89)  
                 1,22 
(0,89)  
                  1,14 
(0,83)  
Hourly wage R$ 
 
                
4,26 
  
                4,35 
  
                3,90 
  
                3,46 
  
                3,38 
  




                
7,00 
(3,68)  
                7,29 
(3,68)  
                7,57 
(3,67)  
                7,74 
(3,63)  
                7,90 
(3,62)  
                8,04 
(3,60)  
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female) 
 
                
0,75 
(0,43)  
                0,75 
(0,43)  
                0,74 
(0,43)  
                0,74 
(0,43)  
                0,73 
(0,44)  


















              
50,05 
(63,56)  
               51,76 
(63,89)  
               51,63 
(63,80)  
              48,43 
(62,28)  
              47,38 
(62,19)  
              46,88  
(62,07) 
Ratio Mercosul exports/sales 
            0,022  
(0,55) 
                
0,024  
(0,62) 
                
0,027  
(0,69) 
                
0,025  
(0,65) 
                
0,023  
(0,64) 
                 
0,018  
(0,56) 














Ratio equity/number of workers 
 
      7.178  
(16.916) 
         7.894  
(17.706) 
           7.937  
(21.021) 
            7.116  
(54.322) 
            6.135  
(14.796) 
           6.596 
(24.881) 
Net profits per worker 
 
              
3.366  
(81.919) 
                
1.812  
(86.458) 
                  
(67) 
(75.978) 
               5.351  
(24.185) 
              6.807  
(122.718) 
             (3.212) 
(337.383) 
Wage bill (pw) 
 
           29.433  
(34.348,89) 
           29.407  
(29.373) 
           25.277  
(25.911) 
           23.245  
(85.141) 
            21.864  
(22.266) 
           23.379  
(136.165) 
Gross profits (pw) 
 
           32.798  
(92.120) 
             31.219  
(94.453) 
            25.210  
(80.979) 
           28.595  
(169.194) 
            28.671  
(127.017) 
            20.166  
(287.223) 














































































Log firm size 
                
6,26  
(1,69) 
                 6,16  
(1,74) 
                 6,13  
(1,74) 
                 6,12  
(1,73) 
                 6,10  
(1,77) 
                 6,13  
(1,81) 
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Table 3b: Descriptive Statistics (exporting firms only): Mean and (Standard Deviation) 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Log hourly wage 
 
              1,62 
(0,98)  
        1,66 
(0,98)  
                 1,54 
(0,95)  
                 
1,42 
(0,93)  
                 
1,39 
(0,94)  
                  
1,31 
(0,88)  
Hourly wage R$ 
 
                
5,05 
  
                5,25 
  
                4,66 
  
                4,13 
  
                4,01 
  




                
7,24 
(3,83)  
                7,60 
(3,84)  
                7,89 
(3,84)  
                8,07 
(3,78)  
                8,20 
(3,80)  
                8,35 
(3,79)  
Gender (1 if male, 0 if female) 
 
                
0,77 
(0,42)  
                0,77 
(0,41)  
                0,77 
(0,42)  
                0,76 
(0,42)  
                0,76 
(0,42)  
                0,76 
(0,42)  
Experience (years) 
               
18,25 
(10,80)  




               17,78 
(10,57)  
               
17,34 
(10,59)  
               
17,25 
(10,68)  




              
60,77 
(71,47)  
               
62,25 
(71,89)  
               61,87 
(71,74)  
              58,15 
(70,07)  
              56,31 
(70,23)  
              55,91  
(70,39) 
Ratio Mercosul exports/sales 
            0,042  
(0,07) 
                
0,045  
(0,08) 
                0,050  
(0,08) 
                
0,046  
(0,08) 
                
0,042  
(0,08) 
                 
0,033  
(0,07) 


















         11.194  
(21.689) 




            8.758  
(17.089) 
           9.602 
(30.091) 
Net profits per worker 
 
              
5.785  
(100.524) 
                
3.385  
(99.786) 
                  
2.031 
(76.860) 
               
9.181  
(328.807) 
              
12.687  
(149.554) 
             (5.020) 
(442.201) 
Wage bill (pw) 
 
           35.596  
(38.052,89) 
           36.287  
(34.928) 
           31.199  
(28.382) 
           29.918  
(115.577) 
            27.388  
(24.430) 
           29.978  
(181.222) 
Gross profits (pw) 
 
           41.381  
(111.935) 
             
39.672  
(110.583) 
            33.230  
(40.238) 
           39.099  
(28.008) 
            40.076  
(40,929) 
            24.958  
(371.872) 














































































Log firm size 
                
7,06 
(1,53) 





                 
6,98 
(1,57) 
                 
6,99 
(1,58) 
                 7,05 
(1,63) 
   16 
Table 4: OLS Regressions  
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
  (2)   (3)   (4)  
       
Schooling  0,0683  0,0683  0,0671 
   (1003,05)  (1003,01)  (991,03) 
Gender  0,1245  0,1241  0,1261 
   (92,79)  (92,53)  (94,71) 
Experience  0,0432  0,0432  0,0430 
   (238,22)  (238,46)  (239,13) 
Tenure  035  035  0344 
   (397,99)  (398,02)  (394,34) 
Foreign firm  0,1413  0,1419  0,1209 
   (485,52)  (487,52)  (415,94) 
Log firm size  0,06462  0,06439  0,05781 
   (888,54)  (884,32)  (792,34) 
Net profit (pw)     0,0374    
      (62,12)    
Gross profit (pw)        0,3490 
         (653,14) 
R
2  0,6444  0,6445  0,6494 
adj. R
2  0,6444  0,6445  0,6494 
F  326.444  324.554  331.673 
All regressions include 6 year dummies, 105 industry dummies, 9 job dummies, 27 region dummies and  
human capital x gender interactions. Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering. 
 
Table 5: 2SLS regressions 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
  Financial IV  Financial IV  All IV  All IV 
Schooling  0,0665  0,0666  0,0714  0,0716 
   (891,5)  (892,22)  (631,86)  (632,43) 
Gender  0,1532  0,1526  0,1905  0,1899 
   (105,01)  (104,46)  (84,75)  (84,40) 
Experience  0,0431  0,0432  0,0471  0,0472 
   (224,52)  (224,72)  (154,83)  (155,09) 
Tenure  0357  0358  0356  0357 
   (366,74)  (367,15)  (257,07)  (257,47) 
Foreign firm  0,1561  0,1595  0,1377  0,1423 
   (454,98)  (464,16)  (324,73)  (334,14) 
Log firm size  0,0707  0,0707  0,0409  0,0402 
   (806,10)  (803,03)  (276,93)  (272,43) 
Net profit (pw)  -0,0548     -0,0746    
   (-115,85))     (-79,64)    
Gross profit (pw)     -0,0420     -0,0504 
      (-80,14)     (-41,46) 
R
2  0,6075  0,6069  0,6399  0,6393 
adj. R
2  0,6075  0,6069  0,6399  0,6393 
F  238.681  238.067  126.646  126.336 
All regressions also include a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, 6 year dummies, 105 industry dummies, 9 job dummies, 27 
region dummies and human capital x gender interactions. Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering.   17 
Table 6: Spell Fixed Effects and Spell Fixed Effects 2SLS Regressions 
Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
  (2)   (3)   (3)  
  No IV  Financial IV  All IV 
Schooling  050  056  03 
   (50,84)  (50,44)  (23,09) 
Experience  0,0280  0,0288  0,031 
   (156,85)  (151,90)  (119,03) 
Tenure  018  019  014 
   (194,88)  (191,80)  (110,59) 
Log firm size  0,0155  0,014  0,024 
   (90,02)  (79,35)  (86,16) 
Gross profit per worker  -2,71E-3  -8,92E-3  -5,19E-4 
         (-18,04) 
R
2  0,031  0,030  0,0308 
adj. R
2  0,031  0,030  0,0308 
F  24.363  23.884  13.049 
Standard deviation of profit per worker  108.712  108.712  221.772 
Lester Range  -1,1%  -3,8%  -0,44% 
All regressions include a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, 6 year dummies, and human capital x gender interactions.  
Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering. 
 
Table 7a. Number of Workers and Firms (sample of firms with more than 30 workers present 
in 1999-2001) 
Year  Number of Workers  Number of Firms 
1999  4.282.851  17.535 
2000  4.498.212  17.535 
2001  4.616.837  17.535 
 
Table 7b. Number of Workers and Firms (sample of exporting firms with more than 30 
workers present in 1999-2001) 
Year  Number of Workers  Number of Firms 
1999  2.420.956  5.090 
2000  2.524.928  5.090 
2001  2.747.058  5.090 
 
Table 8: Spell Fixed Effects and Spell Fixed Effects 2SLS Regressions (Large firms present in 
1999-2001 period); Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  No IV  Financial IV  All IV 
Schooling  0,022  0,022  0,023 
   (126,74)  (126,39)  (93,41) 
Experience  0,0433  0,0432  0,0557 
   (119,84)  (119,55)  (98,56) 
Tenure  011  011  004 
   (70,70)  (70,87)  (22,19) 
Log firm size  0,02  0,02  0,03 
   (61,70)  (79,11)  (67,51) 
Gross profit per worker  -0,0208  0,0147  0,0124 
   (-1,18)*  (56,59)  (48,18) 
R
2  0,0249  0,0251  0,0262 
adj. R
2  0,0249  0,0251  0,0262 
F  8.904  8.988  5.282   18 
Standard deviation of profit per worker  31.011  31.011  63.207 
Lester Range  -0,025%  1,82%  3,13% 
All regressions also include a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, 6 year dummies, 105 industry dummies, 9 job dummies, 27 
region dummies and human capital x gender interactions. Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering. * - not significant at 




Table 9a. Number of Workers and Firms (sample of firms with more than 30 workers present 
in 1999-2001 and with increasing profits) 
Year  Number of Workers  Number of Firms 
1999  482.833  1.625 
2000  511.184  1.625 
2001  528.043  1.625 
 
 
Table 9b. Number of Workers and Firms (sample of exporting firms with more than 30 
workers present in 1999-2001 and with increasing profits) 
Year  Number of Workers  Number of Firms 
1999  333.528  595 
2000  347.523  595 
2001  377.020  595 
 
Table 10: Spell Fixed Effects and Spell Fixed Effects 2SLS Regressions (Large firms present 
in 1999-2001 period, with increasing profits); Dependent variable: log hourly wage 
  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  No IV  Financial IV  All IV 
Schooling  0,013  0,013  082 
   (23,72)  (23,67)  (11,37) 
Experience  0,042  0,042  0,056 
   (34,24)  (34,18)  (31,02) 
Tenure  014  014  010 
   (28,53)  (28,35)  (16,92) 
Log firm size  0,12  0,12  0,16 
   (135,78)  (137,99)  (154,53) 
Gross profit per worker  0,0147  0,0165  0,022 
   (59,48)  (64,04)  (80,92) 
R
2  0,0464  0,0468  0,0648 
adj. R
2  0,0464  0,0468  0.0648 
F  1.775  1.791  1.669 
Standard deviation of profit per worker  84.118  84.118  152.824 
Lester Range  4,94%  5,55%  13,45% 
All regressions also include a quartic in experience, a quadratic in tenure, 6 year dummies, 105 industry dummies, 9 job dummies, 27 
region dummies and human capital x gender interactions. Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering. 
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 Appendix 2. Pooled 2SLS Auxiliary Regressions 
 
Table 2.1: Auxiliary regressions 
Dependent variables: Net (2) or gross (3) profits per worker 
  (2)   (3)  
  Beta  Partial  Beta  Partial 
     R2     R2 
Financial revenues  0,682  07  1,1967  0209 
   (651,62)     (1.065,9)    
Revenues from other firms  0,437  006  0,5297  0277 
   (397)     (448,40)    
Non-operational revenues  0,305  068  0,373  0174 
   (435,88)     (497,70)    
Financial losses  -0,828  0,3798  -0,679  0,25752 
   (-4.096)     (-3.137)    
Losses from other firms  -0,699  0,0216  -0,682  0,02089 
   (-951,25)     (-866,30)    
Non operation losses  -0,462  0,0171  -0,438  0,01466 
   (-893,83)     (-790,29)    
R
2  0,4531  0,3528 
adj. R
2  0,4531  0,3528 
F  154.832  101.001 




Table 2.2: Auxilliary regressions 
Dependent variable: Net (2) or gross (3) profits per worker 
  (2)  (3) 
  Beta  Partial  Beta  Partial 
     R2     R2 
Financial revenues  0,703  0840  1,035  0278 
   (400,33)     (557,77)    
Revenues from other firms  0,423  0068  0,453  0316 
   (262,54)     (226,23)    
Non-operational revenues  0,321  0,0116  0,328  0499 
   (287,68)     (278,15)    
Financial losses  -0,715  0,19167  -0,422  0.06960 
   (-1.636)     (-914,29)    
Losses from other firms  -0,804  0,02814  -0,789  0,02680 
   (-656,21)     (-609,04)    
Non operation losses  -0,486  0,02814  -0,481  0,02344 
   (-652,71)     (-612,01)    
Ratio exports to Mercosul/total sales times   0,188  00004  0,086  0002 
Exchange rate peso/real  (24,88)     (10,80)    
Ratio exports to rest of the world/total sales times   0,440  01130  0,263  0209 
Exchange rate peso/real  (109,61)     (62,17)    
R
2  0,3181  0,2195 
adj. R
2  0,3181  0,2194 
F  39.790  23.735 
All regressions also include all variables used in the second stage equation. Robust standard errors, allowing for worker clustering. 
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Appendix 3. Brazilian Real exchange rates 
 








































Figure 3.2: Monthly Interest Rate (%; SELIC)  
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